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Contract Law. Marr Scaffolding Co. v. Fairground Forms, Inc.,
682 A.2d 455 (R.I. 1996). Where parties to a settlement agree as
to the breadth of a general release, the court will apply an "intent
rule" to determine the applicability of the release to unnamed third
parties.
In Marr Scaffolding Co. v. Fairground Forms, Inc.," the Rhode
Island Supreme Court adopted the "intent rule"2 for application in
interpreting the scope of general releases. General releases are
often used to release the parties to a settlement agreement from
future claims, and often include boilerplate language, or are
crafted by "erring artisans" as was the subject release in this case.3
In Marr Scaffolding, the supreme court refused to permit a defend-
ant, who was not a party to the settlement agreement, to rely on
the omnibus language of the release to escape future claims. 4
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The plaintiff, Marr Scaffolding Co., Inc. (Marr), rented con-
struction material and equipment to contractors and builders.5 In
August 1990, defendant Cement Heads, Inc. (Cement Heads),
rented aluminum forms from Marr for a job in Providence, Rhode
Island, a number of which "disappeared" from the job site.6 With
Marr's permission, Cement Heads then moved some of the mate-
rial to a Westerly, Rhode Island job site, where defendant subcon-
tractor Fairground Forms, Inc. (Fairground), was also working.7
The Westerly job was supervised by general contractor Profes-
sional Building Concepts, Inc. (Professional Building), which was
bonded by Commercial Union Insurance Company (Commercial
Union), and Hartford Insurance Company (Hartford Insurance).8
While working at the Westerly site, Cement Heads and Fairground
1. 682 A.2d 455 (LI. 1996).
2. McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 625 F. Supp. 943,958 (D.II. 1986)
(predicting that Rhode Island courts would adopt the "intent rule" for interpreta-
tion of general releases).
3. Man- Scaffolding, 682 A.2d at 459.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 456.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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"swapped or borrowed Marr's leased material," without Marr's per-
mission.9 Much of this material and equipment was also lost.1o
Marr subsequently sued Cement Heads, Fairground, Profes-
sional Building, and Commercial Union, eventually settling the
suit with the latter three defendants, since the bonding companies
were only liable for the losses Marr incurred at the Westerly site.."
Professional Building, Commercial Union and Hartford Insurance
agreed to pay Marr five thousand dollars in exchange for Marr's
signing a release.-2 Moving for summary judgment, Cement
Heads claimed that the omnibus language of the release "dis-
charged its liability to Marr."*3 Cement Heads argued that the re-
lease was an "integrated and unambiguous written-agreement"
and as such, extrinsic evidence should not be admitted to vary or
contradict its terms. 14 Marr argued that the release only applied
to the named releasees, not to Cement Heads, and submitted sup-
porting affidavits from attorneys for each of the parties to the re-
lease showing "that they neither bargained for nor intended to
discharge any liability that Cements Heads may have to Marr."15
Finding that the language of the release was unambiguous, and
refusing to consider the settling parties' "purported subjective in-
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The applicable part of the release stated:
Marr. .. (hereinafter referred to as 'Releasors') for and in consideration of
Five Thousand ($5,000.00) Dollar [sic) ... has remised, released and for-
ever discharged and do for itself and its successors and assigns hereby
remise, release and forever discharge... Professional Building... and
Commercial Union... and... Hartford Insurance... and any and all
other persons, firms and corporations . . . (hereinafter referred to as
Releasee'), of and from any and all debts, demands, actions, causes of ac-
tion, .. . controversies.... claims, rights, liabilities, suits... now existing,
or which may result from the existing state of things, which Releasors
now have or ever had against the Releasee from the beginning of the
world to the day of the date of these presents ....
in particular and without limitation of the foregoing Releasee is specifi-
cally released from any and all claims for fair market value and fair rental
of scaffolding, or any other claim made in the civil action entitled Marr
Scaffolding Co.... v. Fairground Forms... or any claims that Mart...
may have now or in the future of any nature whatsoever.
Id. at 456-57 (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 457.
14. Id. at 458.
15. Id. at 457.
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tentions about the scope of the release," the motion judge granted
summary judgment to Cement Heads, and Marr petitioned for a
writ of certiorari. 16
BACKGROUND
In Pardey v. Boulevard Billiard Club,17 the Rhode Island
Supreme Court stated that unless it had an "adequate reason to do
otherwise," it would give "significant deference" to general release
terms.' 8 The adequate reason, they suggested, had to be grounded
in factual evidence regarding parties' intent, among other fac-
tors.19 Underlying its willingness to consider the parties' intent is
the court's policy of preventing "third-party defendants from tak-
ing 'gratuitous advantage' of releases in which they took no
part,"20 particularly where the release included boilerplate lan-
guage which seemingly released "the entire world from any and all
claims."21 In Pereira v. Tellier,22 the supreme court ruled that
where settling parties signed a supposed general release, the doc-
ument only released specific parties, if the intent was not to re-
lease unnamed third parties.23
ANALysiS AND HOLDING
The supreme court reviewed the lower court's order under a de
novo standard of review, applying the same criteria as the court
below,24 stating that "summary judgment is appropriate when the
record, viewed in the light most favorable to the [opposing party]
shows... no genuine issue of material fact and... the [movant] is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.25
The Marr Scaffolding court followed the line of analysis
through Pardey and Pereira, finding that the superior court motion
16. Id.
17. 518 A.2d 1349, 1355 (R.I. 1986).
18. Marr Scaffolding, 682 A-2d at 457 (quoting Pardey, 518 A.2d at 1355).
19. Id.
20. Id. (quoting McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 625 F. Supp. 943, 952
(D.R.I. 1986)).
21. Id. at 457-58 (citing Pardey, 518 A.2d at 1355).
22. 583 A-2d 523 (R.I. 1990).
23. Marr Scaffolding, 682 A-2d at 458 (citing Pereira, 583 A.2d at 524).
24. Id. at 457 (citing 6 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice
U 56.27(1), at 56-852 (2d ed. 1993)) (citations omitted).
25. Id. (citing DiQuinzio v. Panciera Lease Co., 641 A-2d 50, 53-54 (R.I. 1994)).
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judge should have examined the parties' affidavits, and possibly
held an evidentiary hearing to determine the "true intentions of
the parties to the original settlement."26 The court noted that the
release identified the releasees by name, excluding Cement
Heads.27 The parties' affidavits showed that the omnibus lan-
guage of the release was not intended to release Cement Heads's
potential liability to Marr. 28
The court further rejected Cement Heads's argument that
"parties to an unambiguous written agreement" such as this re-
lease cannot vary its terms through extrinsic evidence. 29 First, the
court found parol evidence admissible in situations where parties
on both sides of the contract are mistaken about a material aspect
of the contract, which therefore does not represent "their prior
completed understanding."30 Second, since Cement Heads was a
stranger to the settlement agreement, it could not prevent the ad-
mission of parol evidence in the court's effort to interpret the con-
tract.3 ' Third, while Cement Heads contended that the release
was unambiguous on its face, the court found several ambiguities
in the instrument.32 Rather than a global application, as Cement
Heads argued, the court found that the language defining the
"releasee" might simply refer back to the named releasees identi-
fied earlier in the same sentence. 33 The court also found that the
defendants' denial of liability in the release "creates an ambiguity
in regard to exactly who is being released," and if Marr was refer-
ring to other than the named releasees, the document "purports to
speak for the world."34 Furthermore, the release was executed in
exchange for consideration by the identified parties only, sug-
gesting that Marr did not intend to release parties who "provided
no consideration for the release."35 Finally, the court noted that if
every person in the world was to be released, Marr would have re-
leased not only all current, but also all future claims against any-
26. Id. at 458.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 458-59.
29. Id. at 458.
30. Id. at 458-59.
31. Id. at 459 (citing Inman v. Marcus, 43 A-2d 320, 322 (&I. 1945)).
32. I&
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 460.
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one for anything.36 The court granted Marr's petition for
certiorari, quashed the order granting summary judgment in favor
of Cement Heads, and remanded the case to the superior court for
decision in accord with the "intent rule."3
7
In dictum, the supreme court suggested that it might take a
different tack if faced with the situation where parties to a settle-
ment did not agree that the omnibus release language was not
aimed at reaching an unnamed third party defendant.38 Reserving
judgment on that issue, the court hinted that in such a situation
"we may be more inclined to give 'significant deference to the
[broad] terms of a general release.' 3 9 Unlike this case, a third
party defendant in that situation is likely to be construed as being
included in the omnibus language. 40 In addition, the court indi-
cated that it would defer to the general language of the release
where a party to the settlement: 1) "paid consideration for the re-
lease" and claimed that the omnibus language was intentional and
bargained for, in order to avert future claims from unnamed third
parties, or 2) argued that the language was "otherwise of specific
benefit to one of the settling parties."41
CONCLUSION
With its decision in Marr Scaffolding, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court has cleared the path for future interpretation of
general release language which purportedly releases not only the
parties to the settlement, but also unnamed third parties. The "in-
tent rule" requires that extrinsic evidence be admitted to show that
the parties to the original settlement did not intend to release un-
named third parties. Furthermore, a general release which pur-
ports to release the world from claims by the releasee will not bar
36. Id. The court noted that if taken literally, Marr would be committing
'business suicide," since even Marr's customers could claim immunity from meet-
ing their obligations to Marr. Id
37. Id.
38. Id. at 458.
39. Id. (citing Pardey v. Boulevard Billiard Club, 518 A.2d 1349, 1355 (R.I.
1986)).
40. Id
41. Id.
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claims against an unnamed third party where parties to the origi-
nal agreement did not so intend.
Deborah M. Kupa
